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COMMENT AND DISCUSSION
The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism
Yasuo Deguchi
Kyoto University
Jay L. Garfield
Smith College, University of Melbourne, and Central Institute of Tibetan Studies

Graham Priest
Universities of Melbourne and St. Andrews

Introduction
Anyone who is accustomed to the view that contradictions cannot be true and can
not be accepted, and who reads texts in the Buddhist traditions, will be struck by the
fact that these texts frequently contain contradictions. Just consider, for example:

(1)
Twenty years a pilgrim,
Footing east and west.
Back in Seiken,

I've not moved an inch. (Seiken Chiju, PoemY

(2)
Who says my poetry is poetry?
My poetry is not poetry.
Provided you understand my poetry as not poetry
Only then can we discourse together about poetry. (Ry?kan, Poem)2

(3)
What the realised one has described as the possession of distinctive features is itself the
non-possession of distinctive features. (Vajracchedika 5)3

(4)
The very same perfection of insight, Subhuti, which the realised one has preached is in
deed perfection less. (Vajracchedika 13 b)4

(5)
Furthermore, Subhuti, any perfection of acceptance the realised one has is indeed a non
perfection. (Vajracchedika 14e)5

(6)
Everything is real and is not real,
Both real and not real,
Neither real nor not real.

This is Lord Buddha's teaching. (MMK XVIII :8)6
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(7)
Just understand that birth-and-death is itself nirvana. There is nothing such as birth and

death to be avoided. There is nothing such as nirvana to be sought. Only when you real
ise this are you free from birth and death. (Dogen, Sh?ji)7

(8)
As all things are buddha-dharma, there is delusion and realisation, practice, birth and
death, and there are buddhas and sentient beings. As the myriad things are without an
abiding self, there is no delusion, no realization, no buddha, no sentient being, no birth

and death. (Dogen, Sh?ji)8

(9)
Nothing (mu) is absolutely contradictory and self-identical. From this point, every being
(u) is being and at the same time nothing. (Nishida, "Preface" to Collected Philosophical

Papers)9

Some may argue that none of these contradictions is meant to be accepted as
true, that each should, in fact, be interpreted in some other way. Others may argue
that the contradictions are meant to be taken this way, but that this shows that the
views espoused are some kind of irrational mysticism. The point of the present note
is to examine the matter. We will argue that at least some contradictions found in the

texts are indeed meant literally and to be accepted as true. We will also argue that
this is not a mark of irrationality, but, indeed, a consequence of rationality itself. We
will proceed by examining ways that contradictions may arise in Buddhist discourse.
Contradictions not Meant to be Taken Literally
Contradictions may sometimes be found in poetry in Buddhist traditions, for example
in (1) and (2) above. In such contexts, it may be argued, plausibly, that they are not
meant literally. They express something or other, but the poet no more means us to
suppose that some contradiction is literally true than Shakespeare intends us to be
lieve that Juliet is to be found by looking upwards at midday when Romeo tells us
that she is the sun. The contradictions are just poetic license.
Consider the Seiken Chiju poem (1) above. The poet is not literally stating that
he both traveled and did not travel. He is using the contradiction metaphorically to
indicate that even though he has attained realization, the world he has realized is no
different from the one about which he was ignorant; that although he has practiced
long, in the context of all that is to be accomplished, that is as nothing; that while his

steps may be conventionally real, they are ultimately empty; and perhaps more be

sides.

It might be suggested that contradictions in Buddhist discourse always function
in this way: they are intended metaphorically or in some other nonliteral sense. But
this cannot be maintained. Contradictions occur not just in Buddhist poetry, but in
highly theoretical Buddhist texts in the middle of rigorous deductive arguments, for
example those of N?g?rjuna (see 6 above). To suppose that they are metaphors just
does not do justice to these texts.
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Contradictions Meant Literally but not Meant to Be Accepted
Another possibility is that a contradiction is meant literally, but not meant to be
accepted. There are at least two sorts of context in which this may occur. Buddhists
were well aware of the mode of argument called in the West reductio ad absurdum
(in Sanskrit, this is called prasa?ga). Sometimes when contradictions occur in Bud
dhist texts, these are the conclusions of such arguments. For example in the MMK
N?g?rjuna argues against the self-existence of all things, and many of his arguments
are reductio arguments. The self-existence of, for example, space as a primary ele
ment entails unacceptable contradictions. Space would either have characteristics
or would lack them. If it lacks them, then it does not exist, since every existent has
characteristics. But if it has them, it is not a primary element, since a primary element

is what exists prior to any characteristics. So, the self-existence of space as a primary
element entails that space does not exist as a primary element.10 Whether or not it
works, this argument is clearly intended as a reductio of some kind.
But even in the MMK, contradictions do not always occur in contexts that are

plausibly interpreted as the conclusions of reductio arguments. The example (6)
above is most certainly not in a reductio context.

The Ch'an/Zen tradition provides a different kind of example of contradictions
that are used literally, but not meant to be accepted as true. In some schools of
Ch'an/Zen, awakening can occur suddenly, and this sudden awakening can be trig
gered by a certain kind of shock. The shock that triggers awakening is often verbal,
and in these cases it may well be that the shock is produced precisely by the contra

dictory content of an utterance. Zen practice is intended to enable us to transcend
the reality constructed by our own conceptual thinking, and to enable us to perceive
reality just as it is. Such transcendence may be triggered by coming to understand
the inadequacy of conceptual thinking, and, it might be suggested, this can arise
when we see that such thinking leads to irresoluble contradiction. This is one way
to understand certain k?an exercises. Does a dog have Buddha nature? Yes, because
all things have Buddha nature. No, because all things have no nature.
It may certainly be the case that some contradictions in Buddhist, and especially
Zen, discourses function in this way; it can hardly be maintained that all do. This is
simply because many contradictions do not occur in an immediately soteriological
context; they occur in theoretical discourse about Buddhism, such as N?g?rjuna's

MMK and D?gen's Sh?b?genz? (see 6, 7, and 8 above). Contradictions in this con
text are not uttered simply for the psychological effect that they have on the listeners;

in general, they are not intended to trigger fundamental psychological transforma

tion.

Contradictions Meant Literally and to Be Accepted, but as Contextually Ambiguous
Some contradictions that can be found in Buddhist texts can be understood as hav
ing a certain kind of contextuality. Thus, it is often claimed that when helping people
on the path to awakening, it is of no use to tell them things that, although true, they
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cannot understand, and which may even hinder their development. Better to tell
them things that are only partially true, or that are even just plain false, if understand

ing these things takes them to a state where they are better placed to understand
things more profound. In the same way, it is standard practice to teach people New
tonian mechanics before teaching relativity theory. Although the former is false, it
would be very difficult to understand the latter if one did not have a good grasp of
the more elementary theory.
This is the Buddhist stratagem referred to as up?ya, of which much is made in
the Lotus S?tra and other places. And it may be suggested that contradictions in Bud
dhist texts arise because different contradictory assertions are appropriate at different

stages of Buddhist education (or history, since sometimes the doctrine of up?ya is
used by later Buddhist schools to account for the doctrines of earlier schools that
are different from, and opposed to, their own). Thus, for example, it may be argued
that it is perfectly acceptable to teach people that there is a Buddha, the four noble
truths, the eightfold noble path, et cetera. As one may come to understand later,

however, such things are, in a certain sense, distinctly misleading. A better under
standing is achieved by denying all of these things, as does the Heart S?tra.
The device of up?ya cannot account for many of the contradictions that occur in
Buddhist texts, however. This is for the simple reason that contradictions are to be
found located in documents meant for a single audience at a single time. Arguably,
N?g?rjuna's MMK is such a document. Even more clearly, each of D?gen's lectures
to his monks, as reproduced in the Sh?b?genz?, is like this. Indeed, one may some
times find contradictory utterances located back-to-back in such discourses, for ex
ample as in (7) and (8) above. One can hardly take it that a context shift, of the kind
necessary to make sense of an application of the doctrine of up?ya, occurs in the
space of a full stop.
A different, but related, way in which context can be used to defuse a literal con
tradiction concerns the doctrine of two truths or realities. Many M?h?yana Buddhists
endorse the view that there is a conventional reality (truth) and an ultimate reality
(truth). For some Buddhists?for instance, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Gorampa?
conventional truth is something of an illusion. One may have to come to grips with
some aspects of it in the process of up?ya, but it is to be sloughed off in the process
of awakening. For others, for example N?g?rjuna, Candrak?rti, and Tsong khapa, the
notion of conventional reality is more robust. Conventional truth is still truth, just dif
ferent truth.

However one understands the two notions, one may obviously use them to
defuse certain apparent contradictions. Some things, such as that there is a Buddha,
a way, et cetera, are conventional truths; their contradictories?that there is no Bud
dha, no way, et cetera?are ultimate truths.
It is clear that some contradictions located in Buddhist texts should be under
stood in this way. This is certainly what N?g?rjuna has in mind when he says, in
MMK XVIII: 6, that it has been taught that there is a self, that there is no self, that
there both is and is not a self, and that there is neither self nor nonself. Here a natural

disambiguation reads this verse as saying simply that conventionally there is a self;

398 Philosophy East & West

This content downloaded from 131.229.64.25 on Fri, 03 Aug 2018 14:15:00 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

ultimately there is not; there is conventionally, and there is not ultimately; that there
neither is ultimately nor is not conventionally.
However, again, not all contradictions are of this kind. Thus, the most plausible
understanding of some contradictions offered in the MMK, at least as interpreted by
CandrakTrti, is that they express ultimate truths?notably, for example, in the claim

that all things have the nature of emptiness, which is no nature.11 It is certainly an
ultimate truth that all things are empty, and all things includes emptiness. (That is the

doctrine of the emptiness of emptiness, adumbrated by N?g?rjuna and more explic
itly by CandrakTrti and those who follow his interpretation of the MMK in India and
Tibet, as well as by exegetes of M?dhyamaka such as Tsung Mi in China.) Emptiness
in no essence, but is the lack of any essence, and is the essential quality of all things.
It is hence the case, according to M?dhyamaka philosophers and according to those
who accept their doctrines, that ultimately things are essentially essenceless. This,
while perhaps true, is contradictory.12
Before we leave the matter, one further point needs to be made. According to
certain schools of Buddhism, especially M?dhyamaka, the distinction between con

ventional reality and ultimate reality?like all distinctions?is only conventional.
From an ultimate perspective, there is no distinction between conventional reality
and ultimate reality. The thought is taken to its logical conclusion in Zen, in which
to live an awakened life is to lead a perfectly ordinary day-to-day existence (in a
certain way). Now, if ultimately there is no distinction between conventional and
ultimate reality, then the disambiguation provided by the distinction ultimately
collapses. So the prima facie contradiction is more than just prima facie.
Contradictions Meant to Be Taken Literally, and to Be Accepted, and as

Unambiguous
We have seen that there are various ways in which apparent contradictions in Bud

dhist discourses may be defused. And some contradictions, as we have seen, are
best defused in this way. But we have also seen that contradictions may not always
be defused by these mechanisms. Indeed, the discussion has taken us to the point of
seeing why some contradictions in some Buddhist texts cannot be defused. To sup
pose that one ought to defuse them would be to misunderstand.
There are no ultimate truths. As we have put it before: "Ultimate truths are those

about ultimate reality. But since everything is empty, there is no ultimate reality.
There are, therefore, no ultimate truths. We can get at the same conclusion another
way. To express anything in language is to express truth that depends on language,
and so this cannot be an expression of the way that things are ultimately. All truths,
then, are merely conventional."13
If Buddhists were content merely to point mutely to ultimate reality, there would

be nothing more to be said. But they are not. They explain how conventional reality

is simply the imposition of conventional conceptual categories on ultimate reality,
and they explain the delusion about the nature of ultimate reality to which this gives
rise. In the very process, they describe certain things about ultimate reality. The in
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describable is described; indeed, even to say that it is indescribable is to describe it.
In this respect, Buddhism is akin to any of a number of positions that claim that there

is an ineffable reality, and then go on to explain why this is so, in the process, saying

things about that reality. The phenomenon is to be found, for example, in Neopla
tonism, in Advaita Ved?nta, and in Heidegger on Being.14
It could be said that such descriptions are simply up?ya, to be jettisoned as soon
as one can appreciate the nature of ultimate reality directly. Although they might be
seen in this way, this would not do justice to the texts. The texts in question are sim
ply too carefully reasoned and too explicit, and are read by their commentators as
correct. There is indeed a difference recognized in all M?h?yana Buddhist traditions

between, on the one hand, the conceptually mediated, and hence indirect, appre
hension of ultimate reality that one obtains through reasoning and discursive prac
tices, and, on the other hand, the immediate, direct, perception of emptiness that is
the goal of meditative practice. However, the object of these two modes of appre
hension is the same: emptiness, which is identical with dependent origination?the
ultimate truth, which is in turn identical with the conventional truth properly under
stood. The descriptions of ultimate reality, however thin they may be, and however
imperfectly they capture the object of yogic direct perception, are, nonetheless,
taken to be veridical. And again, since the things claimed about ultimate reality are
often contradictory to things claimed about conventional reality, if these two things
are ultimately the same reality it is a contradictory one.
It might be suggested that although such contradictions are true, their truth is in
comprehensible. Such truths, in this view, have the deictic function of ostending the
incomprehensibility of ultimate reality, but cannot themselves be understood. This
view concedes our point that such contradictions are intended as true, but we do
not concede the view that they are incomprehensible. Those who hold that contra
dictions are always and obviously only false will of course find supposing them to be
true incomprehensible. However, despite various orthodoxies, East and West, the
view that some contradictions are true is a perfectly coherent and intelligible view,
as modern studies in dialetheism and paraconsistency have established.15
Let us end with a few words about reductio ad absurdum. We noted that this
mode of argument is well recognized in Buddhist logic. Indeed, it is orthodox in log
ic since at least Dign?ga and Dharmark?ti in the seventh century. Since this inference
depends on the rejection of contradictions, then surely, one might argue, no inter
pretation of Buddhism that accepts contradictions can be correct.
Matters are not that straightforward. There are certainly groups of Buddhists who
accept the authority of Dharmark?ti on the matter, and who therefore would accept
no interpretation of Buddhism that endorses contradictions. However, there is an
older doctrine going back to the time of the Buddha himself. This is the catuhskoti:
a doctrine to the effect that with respect to any claim there are four possibilities:
that it is true (only), false (only), both true and false, or neither true nor false. And
N?g?rjuna, for example, often argues taking these four possibilities explicitly into ac
count. Hence, in certain older traditions, and the traditions not so influenced by
DharmarkTti's logic, there is no legitimate presumption of consistency.
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This leaves an obvious question as to how Buddhist thinkers of this kind, such as
N?g?rjuna, can employ reductio arguments. A full answer to this is no doubt com
plex, but, in brief, contradictions are perfectly acceptable in some contexts but not in
others. Reductio ad absurdum is not reductio ad contradictionem. Some contradic

tions may not be absurd, and not all absurdities are contradictions?and what is
taken to be absurd by one theorist may be different from what is taken to be absurd
by another. In Indian debate logic, a reductio succeeds when the opponent is forced
to concede a consequence that is unacceptable by their own lights, whether or not it

is contradictory. If a contradiction is unacceptable, it will function as the anvil of a
reductio; if not, it will not.

Conclusion
To summarize, we have seen why even serious theoretical Buddhist texts may be
expected to contain contradictions. Such contradictions are integral to certain core
Buddhist, or at least M?h?yana, views. Nor is this some kind of irrationalism. The
contradictions follow from some of the most fundamental postulates of Buddhism.
It does mean, though, that Buddhisms of certain kinds are committed to dialetheism,
the view that some contradictions are true. Those who take that adherence to the

Law of Non-Contradiction is a necessary condition for rationality may well conclude
that, to this extent, such Buddhisms are irrational. But modern developments in para

consistent logics have taught us that one need not draw this conclusion. Buddhism

can be rational although inconsistent?indeed, ultra-rational, since the contradic
tions are the result of following a certain view of the world through to its logical con

clusions.
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